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INTRODUCTION

Hedge funds are currently all the rage. Over the last seven years the hedge
fund industry has averaged close to an eleven percent annual yield,1 as compared
to the Standard & Poor’s (S & P) 3.30%.2 2007 was particularly impressive with
the hedge fund industry yielding slightly over double the S & P’s return.3 Even in
the current economic crisis hedge funds continue to outperform the S & P.4 These
large returns led Linda Thomsen, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s

*

J.D./M.B.A. 2009 Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law & Katz School of Business.
B.A. 2006, University of Rochester. E-mail: Daniel.Etlinger@gmail.com I would like to thank
Professor Peter Oh from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for his comments and suggestions.
1
Patrick Hosking, Hedge Fund Returns are ‘Vastly Overstated’, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 26, 2006,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article735784.ece.
2
S&P 500, STANDARD & POOR’S, Dec. 31, 2007, http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/
index/SP_500_Factsheet.pdf.
3
Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Prominent Hedge Funds Nurse Heavy Losses in 2008, REUTERS, Jan. 23,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/fundsFundsNews/idUSN23863620080123.
4
Gregory Zuckerman & Jenny Strasburg, For Many Hedge Funds, No Escape, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2009, at R7 (stating that through November 2008 hedge funds had lost 18% on average, whereas the S
& P had lost nearly 38%). See also Jenny Strasburg, Gregory Zuckerman & Cassell Bryan-Low, More
Hedge Funds Expected to Succumb, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22-23, 2008, at B2 (predicting hedge fund assets
to fall by as much as 50% from their peak).
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(SEC) Director of the Division of Enforcement, to comment that “[t]hese days, the
money is in hedge funds, so the potential for abuse, the potential for securities law
violations is there because there is so much money there.”5
There is indeed a lot of money in hedge funds, with over $2 trillion in
assets,6 spread out over an estimated 10,000 hedge funds worldwide.7 Due to
relatively low entry costs, aggressive strategies, leveraging and fierce competition
hedge funds are continually being created and disassembled, causing a fluid
number in the market.8 In fact, Credit Suisse predicts that as many as 30% of
hedge funds will have to close due to the economy.9 Although hardly new,10 there
is still no statutory definition for a hedge fund.11 A common description is “any
pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional
investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”12
The controversies surrounding hedge funds have shaken public confidence
and led to calls for increased regulation.13 These proposals, ranging from more
informative online brochures,14 to hedge funds having to adopt Section 2(a)(41) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Act) (affecting how hedge funds
would value securities),15 have not gone unopposed. According to Philip
Goldstein, a co-founder of Bulldog Investors (Bulldog – although there are several
funds under Goldstein, they will collectively be referred to as Bulldog),
“[r]egulatory agencies all the time are doing things that are beyond their authority.
In this country, that’s a very scary thing, because they are not really accountable.

5
Hedge Funds and Wall St. Are Warned to Be Vigilant on Misdeeds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/business/14hedge.html.
6
REPORT OF THE INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS, PRINCIPALS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS, 1 (Apr. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/investors'committeereportapril152008.pdf
[hereinafter Principals].
7
Houman Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REGULATION, Spring 2007, at 38.
8
SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 63 n.218 (1999), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter Implications] (“The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets
report estimated that, based on a sample of 397 hedge funds from 1994 to 1998, the survival rate was
less than 60 percent.”). See also Anthony Hanlon, Proposals for Reform of Hedge Fund Regulation, 11
(Apr. 24, 2002) (unpublished LL.M. written work requirement submission, Harvard Law School),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/tony_hanlon.pdf (highlighting the median
age of hedge funds in 2002 was only 5.3 years).
9
Gregory Zuckerman & Cassell Bryan-Low, More Pressure on Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2008 at C3.
10
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 1 (Apr. 1999), http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgefund.pdf [hereinafter Hedge Funds] (identifying the first hedge
fund as being created in 1949).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054,
72056 n.27 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Registration] (“In a
recent study, over fifty percent of respondents identified hedge funds as ‘most likely to be at the center
of an investment controversy’ in the next five years.”).
14
Judith Burns, SEC Dusts Off Online Plan For Brochures of Advisers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008,
at A14.
15
Implications, supra note 8, at 99.
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You’ve got to sue them!”16
There have been two discrete rounds in the attempt to increase regulation of
hedge funds that Goldstein has challenged. The first involves Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), which provides hedge funds
an exemption from registration if they have less than fifteen clients.17 In February
of 2006, the SEC modified the definition of client from an entire fund counting as
one client to a ‘look-through’ attitude that counts each investor in the fund
separately.18 This change would require many hedge funds that were previously
exempt to register with the SEC through the Advisers Act.19
After several comment letters on the subject, Goldstein finally took the SEC
to court.20 The SEC argued that the term “client” is not defined by the Advisers
Act and thus is ambiguous. Accordingly, the SEC maintained that they could
reasonably interpret the provision as applying to hedge funds.21 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with Goldstein that the new
definition runs counterintuitive to other sections of the Advisers Act and vacated
the rule.22 The SEC subsequently announced that it would not challenge the
decision; the hedge funds essentially earned a temporary truce.23
That truce did not even last a year. Since 1975, Congress introduced
legislation requiring investment managers with at least $100,000,000 to file
reports, under Rule 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
that disclose certain security positions and their value.24 In 2006, two of
Goldstein’s funds crossed this threshold and Goldstein filed a request for
exemption from 13(f).25 When that request was denied, Goldstein filed suit
claiming Bulldog will be monetarily hurt by 13(f) since the public could duplicate
his positions.26 Essentially, Goldstein’s suit advances two arguments. First, these
reports would disclose trading strategies, and thus harm proprietary interests in the

16
Jonathan Shazar, Philip Goldstein: The Man Behind Bulldog, FINALTERNATIVES, Oct. 5, 2007,
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/2595/.
17
Dale Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 1, 8-9 (2006).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See Letter from Philip Goldstein, President, Bulldog Investors, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 25, 2004).
21
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (relying on Chevron v. NRDC, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
22
Id. (arguing the SEC’s definition ran counterintuitive to other provisions of the Advisers Act, the
definition could result in conflicts of interest and the SEC was advocating changing the definition in
some instances but using the old definition in others).
23
Christopher Cox, STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COX CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS IN PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, ET AL. V. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006-2006-135.htm.
24
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a.
25
Karyn McCormack, Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291.htm; see also Telis
Demos, The Man Who Beat the SEC, FORTUNE, Jun. 18, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/06/
magazines/fortune/ Man_who_beat_SEC_Demos.fortune/index.htm (reporting that Bulldog now has
over $500 million in assets and has yielded a 15% return over its lifetime).
26
Dane Hamilton, Hedge Funds Take on SEC Over Disclosure Requirements, CNBC, May 17,
2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/18722751.
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way that Coca-Cola’s Coke formula is a protectable asset.27 Second, the reports
would disclose “unique intellectual property,” and thus violate the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition against taking private property without just
compensation.28
This Article critically evaluates these arguments before ultimately
concluding that 13Fs are critical to monitoring the security markets and informing
investors. Part I reviews the construction and application of 13(f). This part will
first discuss the legislative history and intent behind Rule 13(f) before discussing
how Congress, courts and the SEC have constructed 13(f). Part II then provides a
general overview of hedge funds and their peculiar position within the existing
regulatory framework. Part III explores a trade secret argument to 13(f). Part IV
examines a takings claim against application of 13(f). And finally, Part V looks at
related disclosure proposals. Most proposals are not feasible in their current form
due to costs or undue burdens on the hedge fund industry. However, two proposals
that make a strong case are creating a private market intermediary and changing
the requirements for accredited natural persons.
II.

CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF 13(f)

A. Legislative History of Rule 13(f)
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act were
enacted to regulate the securities markets through disclosure.29 The Securities Act
has two principal goals: 1) to protect investors through disclosure and 2) to outlaw
fraud in the sale of securities.30 The Exchange Act explicitly seeks to promote
efficiency in the markets and to protect interstate commerce, national credit,
federal taxing power and the banking system.31 Taken together, these two acts add
to the age-old adage of caveat emptor by “put[ting] the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller.”32
In the 1960s, Congress became concerned about the growing influence of
financial institutions on markets and considered amending the two acts.33 In 1968,
Congress commissioned the SEC to study the markets and the new trends.34 Over
the next three years the SEC utilized interviews, questionnaires, surveys and

27
Id.; see also Edward Pekarek, Hogging the Hedge? “Bulldog’s” 13F Theory May Not Be So
Lucky, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1079, 1138 n.224 (2007) (“If you are arguing is it could be
worse because you could have to publish every trade, I agree, but that’s like saying that Coca-Cola
doesn’t have to publish its entire formula, but just maybe like thirty percent of all the ingredients, and
that is not so bad.”) (quoting Philip Goldstein, President, Bulldog Investors, Morning Call: Hedge
Funds Spill the Beans, CNBC (Dec. 12, 2006)).
28
Hamilton, supra note 26.
29
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a, 78a.
30
Edward N. Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 6, 9 (1959).
31
Id.
32
H.R. REP. NO. 73-95, at 2 (1933) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
33
Thomas Lemke & Gerald Lins, Disclosure of Equity Holdings by Institutional Investment
Managers: An Analysis of Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 43 BUS. LAW. 93, 98
(1987).
34
Id.
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market portfolios to analyze various aspects of managers.35 The SEC looked at the
number of managers, their size, growth, value of assets, fees and other relevant
information.36
In 1971, the SEC released their findings in its Institutional Study.37 Among
the findings, the Institutional Study showed that managers had shifted their
portfolios to give a higher weight to equities.38 In terms of negative or volatile
swings in the market place, the Institutional Study found that “institutional trading
overall has not impaired price stability in the markets.”39 However, the study did
conclude there was a need for increased disclosure requirements.40 In particular,
the Institutional Study noted:
The past and likely future growth of institutional investors in the equity markets
makes the collection of timely information about institutional holdings and activity
in securities essential for an agency responsible for the administration of the federal
securities laws . . .
The importance of a regularized, uniform, and comprehensive scheme of
institutional reporting cannot be minimized in light of the demonstrated growth of
institutional investment and its impact on the structure of the securities markets,
corporate issuers and individual investors.41

Ultimately, based on their findings, the SEC formally recommended the
Exchange Act be amended to include greater disclosure requirements.42 Several
proposals were drafted and introduced until in 1975 Congress settled on one and
amended the Exchange Act to include Rule 13.43
Specifically, Rule 13(f) requires all investment managers (which can include
hedge funds, banks, pension funds, non-profits and others) who hold certain types
of publicly traded securities worth at least $100,000,000 to file a 13F report four
times a year.44 Individuals are exempt from this reporting due to privacy
considerations.45 In addition, the manager must utilize investment discretion over
the accounts since the purpose is to record information on the activities and
movements of the managers.46
For each security listed, the report must include the title, class, CUSIP
number (an identification number that facilitates the trading and clearing of

35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Lemke, supra note 33, at 99.
39
Id. (quoting Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, at XXI (1971))
[hereinafter Study Report].
40
Id.
41
Id. (quoting Study Report, supra note 39, at X).
42
Id.
43
Lemke, supra note 33, at 99-100
44
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 13(f), 17 C.F.R. rule 13f-1 (referring to 13(f) as the
Exchange Act rule, 13F denotes the actual form itself).
45
Id.
46
Id.
36
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securities), number of shares and aggregate fair market value.47 Fair market value
indicates the value on the last trading day rounded to the nearest one thousand
dollar.48 Transactions of $500,000 or more require additional disclosures that
include the nature of the transaction, per share price, dates of the transaction, dates
of the settlement, the broker and the market(s) in which the transaction was
effected.49
The main purpose of 13(f) is to gather and disseminate data about investment
managers. Congress specifically intended 13(f) to be a means for promptly
providing this information to the public.50 A Senate report recommended 13(f) be
used to promote informed investors, increase regulatory accountability and create
an informational database for use in future reforms,51 all of which in turn would
generate greater market confidence, induce future investors and facilitate tracking
of data.52 The database also would allow a greater understanding of the security
markets as well as their potential impact on banks, other markets and investors.53
Notably, the Exchange Act does not contain language forcing firms to
disclose information about their future positions. Traditionally, the SEC has taken
a conservative view on this issue due to the inherit speculative nature and potential
to (unintentionally) mislead investors.54 According to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, “[o]rdinarily, the SEC and the courts discourage
presentations of future earnings, appraised asset valuations and often hypothetical
data in proxy materials.”55 Although the SEC has since relaxed their future
disclosure rules somewhat they have never amended Rule 13(f) to require future
disclosures.56
B. Construction of Rule 13(f)
The first source of guidance in the construction process is Congressional
Reports. The 1968 Senate report (conducting the research which lead to the
promotion of Rule 13(f)) praised Rule 13(f) as capable of informing investors,
increasing regulatory accountability and creating an informational database that
could be used in the debate for future reforms.57 Acknowledging there might be
some initial discomfort the report mentions:

47

Id.
Lemke, supra note 33, at 110.
49
17 C.F.R. rule 13f-1.
50
Confidential Treatment Filer, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 643 (June 17,
1998) [hereinafter Confidential Treatment Filer].
51
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 78 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 256.
52
Id.
53
Id.; see also Implications, supra note 8, at 94 n.308.
54
Kenneth Scott Fife, Comment, Mandatory Disclosures of Soft Information in the Market for
Corporate Control, 35 EMORY L.J. 213, 215 (1986) (delineating general disclosure rules).
55
Id. (quoting Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1972), overruled in
part by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
56
Id. at 217-18 (allowing forward-looking statements in certain scenarios as long as the statement
“was (1) prepared with a reasonable basis and (2) disclosed in good faith.”).
57
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 77-78 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 256.
48
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[w]hile expanding the reporting burden for certain institutional investment
managers may result in some initial expense to some investment managers, it is
nevertheless clear that it is now appropriate to begin to accumulate such a body of
data to permit reasoned discussion and decision about the influence and impact of
the large institutional investment managers on the securities markets.58

Furthermore, the report mentions that hampering a firm’s competitive edge is
not a reason behind enacting the amendment.59 The report actually acknowledges
“that generally it is in the public interest to grant confidential treatment to an
ongoing investment strategy of an investment manager. Disclosure of such
strategy would impede competition and could cause increased volatility in the
market place.”60
One month later a House Conference Report addressed the same issues.61 A
central message to the report is that “[t]he securities markets of the United States
are indispensable to the growth and health of this country’s and the world’s
economy.”62 The report continued, stating that to remain competitive the
American markets must remain efficient and operate fairly.63 Should the markets
falter along these lines American markets will lose grounds to international
financial centers (including growing international hedge fund centers include in
Hong Kong, Singapore, UK and Germany).64 To help assure the efficiency of
these markets the House supported Rule 13(f).65
In 1983 a Report of the Staff of the SEC noted that “[a]lthough the
Commission does not plan to make extensive use of information that could be
gathered under Rule 13(f) at the present time, we do believe that disclosure of
holdings of institutional managers is in the public interest for the reasons set forth
in the Senate Report.”66 This suggests that in 1983 the SEC was still figuring out
what exactly 13Fs can demonstrate and how best to utilize them.67 More recently,
in 1998, a Commission Notice acknowledged that “Congress also recognized that,
in some instances, disclosure of certain types of information could have harmful
effects, not only on an investment manager, but also on the investors whose assets
are under its management.”68 This implies Congress’ recognition that 13Fs at least
have the potential to negatively impact the value of these portfolios.69

58

Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
60
Id.
61
H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 90-91 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 322.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Full Value Advisors, Application for Exemption from Rule 13f-1, File No. ------- , 14(Oct. 24,
2006) [hereinafter Exemption] (quoting Report of the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the Operation of Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 17 (Nov. 29, 1983))
(emphasis added).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 19 n. 14 (quoting Commission Notice: Re: Section 13(f) Confidential Treatment Requests
(June 17, 1998)).
69
Id.
59
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The second sources to examine are cases. To prove a party is violating the
Exchange Act, willfully or otherwise, it is not necessary to prove they had
knowledge they were in fact violating it.70 Section 21(b) of the Exchange Act
allows the SEC to issue cease and desist orders to an institution in violation of any
of the Exchange Act’s rules.71 This also enables the SEC to require a firm come
into compliance in the future and to correspond with the SEC on their efforts.72
Fraudulent claims also fall under Rule 10(b)-5 of the Exchange Act stating that no
“manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection with securities may be used,
otherwise the SEC has the right to act to protect the public interest.73 Remedies
available allow the SEC to investigate and to publish wrongdoings, judicial
enforcement, sanctions, suspensions, and requiring compliance in the future.74
For managers that comply with the Advisers Act there are further provisions
to examine.75 Section 80b-3 gives the SEC authority to censure a firm, to limit a
manager’s activities and to suspend or revoke registration for certain violations.76
The first of these violations is filing any false report with the SEC; including
13Fs.77 The Act expands this idea to say that the SEC can bring an action for any
act by a manager to defraud a client.78 Section 80b-3e5 is even broader still,
stating that the SEC can bring action for a violation of any provision of the
Exchange Act.79
The SEC only has a budget of $888 million (.035% of the United States’
total budget) and approximately 3,000 employees.80 In 2006, the SEC lost 155
employees and their total cases dropped 9%.81 Despite these obstacles, since Rule
13(f)’s enactment the SEC has exhibited an increased willingness to take formal
actions.82 These actions fall into three distinct categories. The first is a failure to
report 13F forms altogether.83 The second is filing 13F reports past when they are
due (which has happened only once).84 The third is filing fraudulent 13F forms.85
In SEC v. Mogy, a Rule 13(f) issuer failed to file its required report for a
significant amount of time.86 The court determined that the issuer had met all of

70

Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 21(b).
72
Id.
73
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
74
15 U.S.C.S. § 78u.
75
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-1.
76
15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e.
77
15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e1.
78
15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e6.
79
15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e5.
80
Carl J. Nelson, Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: A Proposal to Maintain Hedge Funds’
Effectiveness Without SEC Regulation, 2 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 221, 229-30 (2007).
81
Id. at 230.
82
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70-71(1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 248-49.
83
17 C.F.R. rule 13f-1. .
84
Id., see e.g., Paramount Capital Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 89,121 (June 27, 1989),
available at http://sec.gov/news/digest/1989/dig062789.pdf (failing to file a timely 13F report caused
Paramount to revise and then present policy modifications to prevent this from occurring again).
85
Id.
86
Joel R. Mogey Inv. Counsel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44,268, 74 SEC Docket 2007 (May
71
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the requirements but failed to file a report for six years and therefore imposed a
civil penalty of $25,000, as well as an order to file 13F reports.87 Similarly, in
2007, Quattro Global Capital, LLC was forced to comply with Rule 13(f) and pay
substantial civil penalties of $100,000.88 The increase in penalty was due to
Quattro’s inclusion of 13F forms in its compliance manual, reminders by outside
auditors and prompting by the SEC during the period in which they failed to
report.89
In Cabot Money Management, Inc., a Cabot director repeatedly praised one
stock (Presstek) as “the best stock we have ever uncovered in our lifetime of
searching for super-growth stocks” in their investment advisory letters.90 During
this period Cabot met all of the Rule 13(f) requirements, but failed to file a 13F
twice.91 Also during this period Presstek’s stock swung between $200 and $60.92
Since Cabot failed to file 13Fs, and due to the severity in the swings of Presstek’s
stock, the court ordered Cabot to file 13Fs in the future and to pay a penalty of
$12,500.93
There has been one case for filing false information in a 13F report.94 SEC v.
Sacane is a civil action in which a private plaintiff sued Durus Capital
Management, LLC, for alleged damages sustained from material omissions and
misrepresentations within its 13F.95 The action was cogently based on a fraud-onthe-market theory,96 but ultimately was dismissed for failure to plead a proper
complaint.97 After the case, United States Attorney Kevin O’Connor stated in a
press release:
“It is our hope that this prosecution will send a message to hedge fund operators
that the federal government is watching . . . [T]he failure to obey securities laws,
especially by making false statements in SEC filings on which investors rely, is a
serious crime. Violators will be vigorously prosecuted.” 98

These cases indicate the SEC’s willingness to monitor and to enforce

7, 2001).
87
Id.
88
Quattro Global Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 37,573, 62 SEC Docket 994 (Aug. 15,
1996).
89
Id.
90
Cabot Money Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,573, 62 SEC Docket 1562 (Aug. 15,
1996).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Sacane, Civil Action No. 2:05cv1575-SRU (2005).
95
Id. at 23 (filing that Durus owned 5,283,248 shares of Aksys stock, when in fact they owned
over 10,000,000 shares resulting in the deflation of Aksys’ stock).
96
Id. at 39 (stating that misrepresentations affect the price of securities on an open market and that
investors rely on the price to make their decisions, established by Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 116061 (3d Cir. 1986)).
97
Id. at 58-60.
98
Hedge Fund Officer Who Assisted in the Filing of False SEC Statements is Sentenced, United
States Attorney’s Office District of Connecticut, Mar. 6, 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
ct/Press2006/20060306.html.
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compliance with Rule 13(f). However, since its inception there have been only
five cases to reach this stage, a relatively small amount compared to the SEC’s
overall caseload of defrauding clients.99 There were three cases for failure to file,
one for filing late and one for a fraudulent filing. This suggests that to a large
extent firms are willing to comply with Rule 13(f)’s requirements.
The third, and last, source that is of help is SEC Opinion Letters and
Releases. The SEC has also spent considerable time clarifying Rule 13(f)
issues.100 One of these issues is how managers can exempt out of Rule 13(f).101
The SEC has expressed its concerns that “many Form 13F filers have concluded
that confidential treatment of information contained on Form 13F will be granted
automatically upon a superficial showing of need. Such a conclusion is
erroneous.”102 The SEC instead has identified four major categories for
confidentiality: 1) information that would identify securities held by a natural
person, 2) revealing a strategy, 3) open risk arbitrage positions and 4) block
positioning.103
These four categories are similar in that they all require a showing of a
specific, rather than general, strategy, as well as resulting harm in disclosure.
These are just two of the steps the SEC looks for.104 Typically, exemptions are
issued only if a manger demonstrates 1) a justification for the time period sought,
2) a specific investment strategy, 3) the strategy is ongoing, 4) disclosure would
reveal the strategy and 5) demonstrable harm from disclosure.105
A second issue the SEC has spent time clarifying is issuers now filing 13F
forms online via the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval
system (EDGAR).106 This change follows the legislative intent to have a rapid
dissemination of the information.107 Consistent with rule changes, the SEC
solicited comments from individuals, companies and industry representatives
affected by the change.108 Their names were not released, but six individuals
suggested submitting 13F forms more frequently109 and the industry representative
99
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stated the current time period remained appropriate.110 The SEC also encouraged
comments addressing whether electronic filing of 13Fs would have an adverse
effect upon competition, but did not receive any letters on this point.111 These
letters suggests the industry as a whole accepted the Rule 13(f) requirements.112
III. THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
A. Definition
Although hedge funds avoid statutory definition they can be identified by
meeting several key features. The first is that they are investment managers not
marketed to the general public.113 Second, investors are limited to high net worth
individuals and institutions.114 Third, hedge funds are not registered as an
investment company under the Investment Act or similar regulations.115 Fourth, a
hedge fund’s assets are managed by an investment manager whose gains in part
rely on the performance of the portfolio.116 And fifth, there is typically a lock-in
period which restricts investor redemption rights.117
Breaking down these five points will illuminate the nature of hedge funds
further. First, they are not marketed to the general public (largely in part since
they are only offered to sophisticated investors).118 Under the Securities Act
Regulation D Rule 506 hedge funds are prohibited from making general
solicitations or general advertising.119 However, an important exemption to the
rule allows hedge funds to market themselves to institutional investors, accredited
investors or natural persons with a net worth over $1,000,000.120 They do so
primarily by sending out targeted material and by cooperating with financial
advisers who make recommendations to sophisticated investors where they should
invest. A hedge fund will stress to this segment a high rate of return, steady
performance, unique strategies and other strengths they possess to gain their
business.121
The second premise, only sophisticated investors can invest, is the lynchpin
behind hedge funds. In theory, sophisticated investors understand investment risks
and therefore are well equipped to deal with the aggressive, less disclosed
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strategies hedge funds employ. By limiting themselves to only sophisticated
investors this allows hedge funds to exempt out of many regulations, their third
premise.
The third characteristic of hedge funds is that they are exempt from many
registration requirements.122 Hedge funds are exempt from many of the reporting
obligations of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.123 Furthermore, hedge
funds are exempt from the registration requirements of the Investment Act and the
Advisers Act.124 Despite this, many hedge funds will voluntarily register with an
agency.125 In 2006, roughly 86% of hedge funds had voluntarily registered with
some regulatory agency.126 Hedge funds voluntarily register for several reasons,
including a need to establish legitimacy, to attract capital from certain markets (by
giving assurances to investors) and to establish a rapport with regulatory bodies.127
The essence of a hedge fund is the same as any investment manager. They
monitor markets and trends and make educated predictions on where best to invest
money.128 These investments yield returns with which the hedge funds, in part,
make their profits off of.129 To effectuate their trades hedge funds interact with a
number of different partners.130 Counterparties, including banks and brokerdealers, take the other side of a hedge fund position.131 Broker-dealers and future
broker-dealers help consolidate and clear trades for the hedge fund.132
Lastly, since hedge funds can employ long term strategies that require a
minimal amount of capital in the pool to work, they employ lock-in strategies.133
A typical lock-in period is from one to three years,134 and varies in how severe an
investor’s redemption rights are (only a few restrict an investor from pulling out
any money from the fund, most restrict the amount to a low percentage).135 Hedge
funds often buckle under when their lock-in periods are not sufficient and panic
strikes their investors.136 Some hedge funds are pushing back and installing longer
“lock-in” periods.137 Due to the 2008 credit crunch, along with tighter lending
policies and heavy losses from mortgage securities, hedge funds are seeking longer
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lock-ins to stabilize their funds.138
To better understand the definition of hedge funds still one might compare
them to other pooled investment vehicles, the first of which are registered
investment companies. Registered investment companies have a number of
similarities to hedge funds that causes investors to mistakenly take them for one.139
Both engage in holding and investing pools of securities through a professional
asset manager, who can follow similar investment strategies and investment
vehicles.140
However, registered investment companies register under the Investment
Act, the Securities Act and the Advisers Act and are subject to their disclosure and
reporting requirements.141 These differences manifest into greater transparency,
public solicitation, and eventual acceptance of unsophisticated investors, governing
board of directors and other structural changes.142 Registration also affects the
company operationally and can limit their choice of strategies, issues with
leveraging and investment vehicles.143
A second comparison can be made to private equity funds. Private equity
funds, like hedge funds, are a type of unregistered investment strategy.144 Since
they are unregistered they cannot solicit to the general population and generally
attract high net worth individuals and institutions.145 In addition, private equity
funds follow the legal formula for incorporation as a limited liability company
(LLC) or limited partnership (LP) and utilize the master-feeder structure like hedge
funds do.146
But, however, private equity funds differ from hedge funds in several
material ways. Private equity funds investors agree to invest their capital over the
life of the fund at staggered intervals.147 These intervals are not necessarily
predetermined and can be induced by “capital calls” on the part of the fund.148
Redemption rights also differ. Typically the fund is established with long-term
goals and redemption before its contractual conclusion can be difficult.149
One last assessment can be made with venture capital funds. Venture capital
funds have similar elements to hedge funds that mirror private equity funds’
commonalities.150 Venture capital funds are unregistered, structurally similar,
attract similar investors and have mandatory capital contributions over a staggered
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period.151 An additional similarity is that they will often have a controlling
influence (such as sitting on the board of directors) over the companies they invest
in.152
In contrast, venture capital funds almost exclusively look to invest in
companies who are in their start-up or infant stages.153 Venture capital funds also
seek to liquidate their positions as soon as they make a suitable profit on their
investment.154 Hedge funds, on the other hand, may hold onto these positions long
afterwards based on their portfolio needs (such as making sure they have at least
one highly liquid position).155
B. Performance
Although hedge funds command roughly $2 trillion in assets this is still a
relatively small amount compared to other sectors of the financial market.156
Heading into the new millennium “commercial banks had $4.1 trillion in total
assets; mutual funds had assets of approximately $5 trillion; private pension funds
had $4.3 trillion; state and local retirement funds had $2.3 trillion; and insurance
companies had assets of $3.7 trillion.”157
Despite holding nearly $2 trillion in assets as a whole there are very few top
players. Only “3% of funds manage more than $500 million, 15% of funds
manage $100-$500 million, and roughly 38% manage each category of $5-25
million and $25-100 million.”158 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan has speculated that consolidation in the hedge fund industry will occur
to create firms that can compete at the top levels.159
Hedge funds’ assets, as a percentage of GDP, haves jumped from 5.6% to
15% from 2003 to 2007.160 The ascension of hedge funds is due to a variety of
reasons. For one, hedge funds have earned a reputation for producing outstanding
years with sustained above-average returns (yielding about 8% above the S & P
over the last seven years).161 A second reason is that hedge funds utilize greater
diversification than traditional managers to provide portfolios that can survive any
type of political/economic climate.162 There have been some attempts to quantify
how successful hedge funds have been by looking at the risk and returns of hedge
funds based on samples, but the results are still speculative.163
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Due to their strong performance and growth, hedge funds can significantly
influence the market. Hedge funds can enhance liquidity, reallocate financial risk
and lead to innovation, all of which promotes efficiency and evolution.164 Patrick
Parkinson, Deputy Director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the
Federal Reserve Board, stated in 2006:
In various capital markets, hedge funds are increasingly consequential as providers
of liquidity and absorbers of risk. For example, a study of the markets in U.S.
dollar interest rate options indicated that participants viewed hedge funds as a
significant stabilizing force. In particular, when the options and other fixed income
markets were under stress in the summer of 2003, the willingness of hedge funds to
sell options following a spike in the options prices helped restore market liquidity
and limit losses to derivatives dealers and investors in fixed-rate mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities. Hedge funds reportedly are significant buyers of the
riskier equity and subordinated tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
and of asset-backed securities, including securities backed by nonconforming
residential mortgages.165

However, hedge funds also have the potential to disrupt markets.166 Due to
their excessive leverage and aggressive strategies hedge funds can exacerbate
conditions and increase the volatility and uncertainty in markets.167 Whether
hedge funds are viewed in a positive or negative light, it is consistently held that
they have a significant impact on the markets.168
C. Structure
Hedge funds usually incorporate as a limited partnership (LP) or limited
liability corporation (LLC), maintaining both onshore and offshore presences (for
legal and tax purposes).169 Typically, the onshore and offshore accounts follow
Yale ICF Working Paper No. 06-10, (Sept. 2006); see also Burton Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge
Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 6. (2005).
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Luncheon in New York City, Oct. 18, 2005, available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/
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similar strategies, securities and advisers and are both offered to clients.170
Usually this operates on a master-feeder structure that trades through a single
entity to accommodate both taxable and tax exempt (such as pension funds or
charitable trusts) investors.171 The following chart summarizes much of the
information about performance, structure and other key statistics:
Characteristics

Mean

Median

Mode

Fund Size

$87 million

$22 million

$10 million

Fund Age

5.9 years

5.3 years

5.0 years

Minimum investment

$695,000

$250,000

$250,000

Number of Entry Dates

34

12

12

Number of Exit Dates

28

4

4

Management Fee

1.7%

1.0%

1.0%

Performance Allocation

15.9%

20.0%

20.0%

In Securities Industry

17 years

15 years

10 years

In Portfolio Management

11 years

10 years

10 years

required

(“Fee”)

Manager’s Experience

Percent Responding “Yes”
Manager is a U.S. registered investment advisor

45%

ultimately shot down in the Senate. However, with the upcoming election and possible changes in the
makeup of Congress and the White House the issue could be renewed. Should the bill be reintroduced
and higher taxes are passed hedge funds may yet again change their incorporation strategy to best adapt
to these changes).
170
Implications, supra note 8, at ix.
171
Id. at 9-10.
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Fund has hurdle rate

17%

Fund has high water mark

75%

Fund has audited financial statements or audited

98%

97

performance
Manager has $500,000 or own money in fund

75%

Fund can handle “hot issues”

53%

Fund is diversified

57%

Fund can short sell

84%

Fund can use leverage

72%

Fund uses derivatives for hedging only, or none

71%172

This survey exposes some shocking results. The first is the relative
inexperience of the field. A fund’s age of roughly six years pales in comparison to
other major financial institutions that have been around sometimes as old as 100
years.173 Though a manager’s experience is slightly greater, this still is relatively
short when contrasted to top executives at traditional investment managers who
have several decades under their belt.174
A second surprise is that the minimal investment required by hedge funds is
well above the statutory benchmark.175 One reason this number is so high is that
some hedge funds set the minimum high because they only cater to institutions,
pension funds and endowments that invest hundreds of millions at a time.176 The
rationale is that there are now fewer clients to handle and therefore the ability to
negotiate, keep in touch and cater to each client is improved.177
The management and performance fees, entry dates and exit dates all fit with
the common descriptions and definitions advanced by the government.178 The
fund size also complies with earlier reports, including Greenspan’s recognition that
there are very few players at the top.179
172
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The “Yes/No” portion of the survey also indicates some unusual
phenomenon. The most surprising is that only 57% are diversified, when the
cornerstone to hedge fund investment strategies is to diversify and therefore
survive in all climates.180 A second revelation is that three out of every four
managers have significant amounts of their money in their own funds.181 This is
an example of putting all of one’s eggs in one basket. Should the unthinkable
happen and a fund goes under not only does the manager lose his/her source of
revenue but also much of their personal income.
A new structure in the hedge fund world is fund of funds.182 Fund of funds
pool capital and then invest in a package of hedge funds.183 Some regulators are
concerned that this option will circumvent investor qualifications for hedge funds
and open up to the general public.184 Fund of funds have grown in popularity since
they are seen as a way to quickly and efficiently diversify an investor’s risk across
hedge funds.185 The fee structure for this scenario is similar to traditional hedge
fund fees, with both performance and fixed components.
D. Fees, Strategies and Leverage
A typical fee hedge funds extract for their services is to take one to two
percent as a management fee (a fixed fee) and roughly twenty percent of the fund’s
profits as well (a performance fee).186 Hedge funds will invest in a variety of
instruments, including over-the-counter instruments (particularly derivatives) or
markets involving foreign exchange, short positions, futures, equity and income to
earn these fees.187 Hedge funds also employ a vast array of sophisticated strategies
(i.e. currencies, derivatives and short positions) to gain value for their funds and
justify the fees.188
Strategies are often lumped into four different groups: 1) Market Neutral
Group, 2) Long/Short Equity Group, 3) Directional Trading Group, and the 4)
Specialty Strategies Group. Market Neutral strategies typically invest in an
opportunity unique to one sub-set of securities while maintaining broad exposure
(and therefore hedging risks) against wider securities.189
Common strategies in this group include Equity Market Neutral
opportunities where a manager invests in short and long security positions to
encompass gains and losses in the market.190 A second type is Distressed
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Securities, where managers invest in companies having financial difficulties and
stand to make money should they successfully reorganize.191 A third type is
Special Situations where a firm may long or short a stock due to a unique occasion
(such as an acquisition or merger).192 Three other highly utilized methods include:
Statistical Arbitrage – The manager uses quantitative criteria to choose a long
portfolio of temporarily undervalued stocks and a rough equal-sized short portfolio
of temporarily overvalued stocks. Trades tend to be short-term and the overall
portfolio is usually neutral in terms of various risk characteristics (beta, sector
exposure, etc.). ‘Pairs trading’ is a common form of statistical arbitrage. . .
Event-Driven – The manager focuses investment activities on significant catalysttype events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisition, bankruptcy reorganizations,
recapitalizations and share buybacks. Some managers who employ Event-Drive
trading strategies may shift the majority weighting between Merger Arbitrage and
Distressed Securities, while others may take a broader scope. Typical trades and
instruments used may include long and short common and preferred stocks, debt
securities, options and credit default swaps. Leverage may be employed by some
managers. . .
Merger arbitrage – The manager will take positions in companies undergoing
“special situations,” for example, when on firm is to be acquired by another, or is
preparing for a reorganization or spin-off. A frequent trade is “long the acquiree,
short the acquirer.”193

The Long/Short Equity Group primarily relies on long and short exposures in
the market. Aggressive growth strategies target companies whose earnings per
share are expected to take off (due to price momentum or other factors).194 Short
selling is the exact opposite as a manager targets stocks he/she feels are overvalued
and therefore eventually their value will fall.195
Directional Trading Groups look at general trends and predicted future of the
environment. Futures are where a hedge fund agrees to buy/sell a stock for a given
price in the future, trying to capitalize on the predicted movement of the stock.196
Macro strategies invest in global trends and predict asset classes as a whole (for
instance a hedge fund may predict the U.S. dollar will fall).197 One last strategy is:
Market Timing – The manager attempts to predict the short-term movements of
various markets (or market segments) and, based on those predictions, moves
capital from one segment to another in order to capture market gains and avoid
market losses. While a variety of investment categories may be used, the most
typical ones are various mutual funds and money market funds. Market timing
managers focusing on these mutual funds are sometimes referred to as mutual fund
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switchers.198

The last group is the Specialty Strategies Group, which acts as a catch-all
that includes special, diverse strategies.199 Emerging Markets invest in developing
economies that have huge potential (such as Brazil or India).200 And Income
strategies look at current income vehicles like bonds to gain quicker returns.201
To magnify their strategies, hedge funds often utilize various levels of
leveraging (borrowing money to amplify positions).202 Traditional managers are
limited by the Investment Act which can dictate how they gain leverage (i.e. openended investment companies can only leverage through bank loans) and also by
how much a manager can leverage.203 Hedge funds are not subject to these
constraints and thus can obtain higher degrees of leverage from a wider range of
sources, which increases the returns as well as risks of a hedge fund.204
IV. TRADE SECRET ARGUMENT
Hedge funds such as Two Sigma Investments and Bulldog have advanced
trade secret arguments against Rule 13(f). Much like hedge funds, trade secrets
resist definition.205 For instance, the Restatement (First) of Torts (Restatement)
has struggled to define the term but ultimately published its definition of a trade
secret as:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.206

The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) which, while acknowledging that a
precise definition is difficult, added to the concept the idea that a trade secret is
subject to reasonable constraints to keep it secret.207 A typical two prong test
courts use is “[first prong - the plaintiff] possessed a trade secret and [second
prong] that the defendant used that trade secret in breach of an agreement, a
198
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confidential agreement, or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means.”208
Although there are no hard and fast rules for establishing the first prong, at the
very least, the claimant must show they were actively trying to prevent the release
of their information.209 In an SEC comment letter to the UTSA, they advise that
some standard examples are advising employees that there is a trade secret,
limiting knowledge of the trade secret to a need to know basis and limiting plant
access.210
Justifications for trade secret protection fall into three categories.211
Economically, trade secrets provide remedies and protections additional to
conventional tort laws and thus may inspire innovation.212 Philosophically, it’s
accepted that one person should not unjustly benefit from acquiring a trade secret
through some improper means (such as breach of confidence).213 The third, and
weakest, argument is a populist one – the vast majority of states support protection
and this perpetuates protection.214
A. First Prong – Possessing a Trade Secret
Hedge fund interests arguably constitute “property” that is protected by trade
secret law and the Fifth Amendment.215 Again there is no set test to determine a
trade secret exists but the Restatement identified six key factors:
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside of his business;
(2) The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his
business;
(3) The extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) The value of the information to him and to his competitors;
(5) The amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
(6) The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.216

Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, an intellectual property professor, examined in
further detail “reasonable efforts” to establish and protect a trade secret.217 He
concluded that a manager must show they expended substantial resources,
including financial and man-power.218 Other relevant economic considerations are
the extent of adequate protections, compliance with industry standards,
communication to and restriction thereof concerning employees, and non-
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disclosure documentation when it is necessary to divulge the information to thirdparties.219 Professor Beckerman-Rodau next raised ascertainable factors such as
the amount of time and money necessary to reverse-engineer the secret, thirdparties’ unsuccessful attempts at duplication as well as third-party willingness to
pay for the information.220
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court addressed mandatory data
about pesticides that were submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency and
then ultimately published.221 The Court held the information is in fact protected by
trade secret law, first recognizing that various intangible interests can be seen as
property under the Fifth Amendment.222 The Court reasoned that due to the fact
that the data requires extensive financial resources to ascertain (typically five to
fifteen million dollars annually), a lengthy period of time to develop (usually
fourteen to twenty-two years), thousands of screened pesticides before endorsing
one and the security measures in place to guard the information that it was in fact a
trade secret.223
Goldstein’s exemption relied heavily on the Ruckelshaus case.224 Goldstein
uses the case to support his strategies are considered property, the disclosures are
mandatory and he claims there are no reciprocal benefits for his firm.225 However,
Goldstein fails to provide the amount of man hours, resources and finances
employed to protect his information.226 These are all steps that are advertised in
the Restatement and important to the Ruckelshaus Court.
There has, on the other hand, been a history of Goldstein and Bulldog
revealing the very same privileged information they now desperately seek to
protect.227 There are three major instances that hinder his argument: a publication
to a court, a letter and a failure to secure information about a private offering.228
To the court, it might now appears that Goldstein utilizes the information when it
is in his favor but now feels that information would hamper his competitive
edge.229
The first is during a lawsuit between Goldstein and Lincoln National
Convertible Securities Fund, Inc. the facts included stated that “Goldstein provided
investment advice and money management services to family, friends and four
clients.”230 All of these funds had varying investment objectives and different
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degrees of control, but they did allow Goldstein discretionary trading privileges.231
Through the testimony of Goldstein’s family, friends and clients, many of whom
were Bulldog investors, it became clear to the court that Goldstein discussed at
length strategies and implementing procedures.232 A key issue is that many of
these are discussions about strategy with the investors that occurred before the
trades were actually executed and protected.233 There are no obvious studies on
the information hedge fund managers informally give, however, if a future case is
brought this would, again, be an issue to examine.
The second occurrence was in September 2006, less than a month before
Goldstein filed the exemption request.234 In a Conference Call with Millennium
Media Consulting Money Manager Series Goldstein “revealed aspects of his hedge
fund investment strategies for generating ‘alpha.’”235 HedgeCo, an online
informational portal on hedge funds, defines alpha as the value a hedge fund
produces by comparing the manager’s performance against a risk-free investment
(like a United States Treasury Bill).236 Therefore, revealing the firm’s alpha
strategies is tantamount to Goldstein revealing the firm’s overall investment
strategies.237 Managers often publicly speak about their hedge fund, differentiating
it from others often by discussing their strategies at a broad level (for instance six
other managers spoke at the same event Goldstein did).
The third instance involves a complaint lodged against Goldstein.238 The
Secretary of the Commonwealth Securities Division for Massachusetts brought the
claim alleging several wrongdoings.239 Although Goldstein was ultimately found
not guilty of these charges they do cast the shadow of doubt on his situation.
Among these were violations of the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act for
having improper security controls on their website.240 Prospective clients can
access the website only by agreeing to a superficial disclaimer, and can then view
the private offerings.241 Again, hedge funds need to carefully monitor what
information is displayed on their websites to avoid a claim of general solicitation.
These offerings can reveal substantial information about the firm’s investing
philosophies and strategies.242 Not only did Bulldog passively allow this
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information to come out, but the complaint also alleges that Bulldog sent e-mail
investment solicitations to at least one Massachusetts resident which included
investment strategies, investment examples, performance analyses and asset
information among other firm information.243 Goldstein has publicly and
repeatedly dismissed these charges and promoted First Amendment rights as his
defense.244
B. Second Prong – Improper Appropriation of the Trade Secret
The second prong requires proof that disclosure of the information to be
protected information would unfairly benefit or advantage a competitor.245 13F
forms arguably enable investors to reverse-engineer hedge fund investments. For
instance, David Ross, a Vice President for an economics consulting firm, argues
that looking at sequential filings can let an investor adequately determine the net
amount of shares bought or sold of a particular stock during a quarter.246
Furthermore an investor could deduce the number of shares currently being held by
the company.247 Although investors may have some difficulty in precisely
replicating a hedge fund’s strategy a 13F could enable one to determine the fund’s
weights for various sectors, new holdings, the level of its strategic aggressiveness,
timing of purchases and sales and other critical decisions.248
The SEC will argue that the information contained in 13F forms will provide
at best snippets of a firm’s strategy, rather than a complete guide.249 For one, not
all securities must be reported.250 Only those that are publically traded, such as
those on the New York Mercantile Exchange, are included.251 Many positions like
short stocks (whether on short equity, future or option positions) are not
reported.252 Shares of open-ended investment companies (like mutual funds),
shares less than 10,000 in number and less than $200,000 in value, shares that
243
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appear only on foreign exchanges and put or call options that the firm itself writes
all do not need to be included.253
The first issue with 13Fs is their content, the second are their timing.254 By
the time these reports are made available to the public the information is forty-five
days old.255 Many hedge fund strategies move quickly and by the time the reports
are published their opportunities are over. For example, Event Driven, Merger and
Market Timing strategies are all very sensitive to current market conditions and
may be outdated by the time 13Fs are published.
The last argument the SEC will advance is the manager’s ability to seek an
exemption from 13(f). Rule 13(f)(3) provides the SEC with the power to grant
confidential treatment on a case by case basis.256 Therefore when a manager meets
these requirements (most importantly a specific strategy and resulting harm) the
SEC will cooperate with the firm in protecting that strategy.257 These three
responses will most likely be enough for the SEC.
V.

ANALYSIS UNDER A REGULATORY TAKINGS ARGUMENT

The concept of a takings argument has a rich and complicated history. The
basis for a takings action is grounded in the Fifth Amendment which states “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”258
Much of the following casework focuses on real property. At the heart of Berman
v. Parker, a seminal case before the Supreme Court, a Redevelopment Act
authorized the government to seize blighted property in an attempt to stimulate
growth.259 One shopkeeper argued that his affected land was commercial, not
residential, and would be redeveloped under private management thus violating his
rights.260 The Court upheld the statute and gave broad deference to the
Legislature’s use of eminent domain.261 This broad understanding has been upheld
through many cases.262
For over 100 years, courts have recognized instances where government
regulations are to such a high degree that they are in essence a government taking,
even if physical property is not seized.263 An important decision in Kelo v. City of
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New London reaffirmed a broad understanding for regulatory takings.264 The
Court reviewed a development plan that needed to seize property from several
shopkeepers to complete the project.265 Although their property was not blighted,
the Court once again gave great deference to the city’s determination.266 One year
after the Kelo decision, President Bush issued an Executive Order stating that
regulatory takings are necessary to preserve the general interest and not just
advancing the economic interest of private parties.267
To fully analyze a regulatory takings argument the scenario must be assessed
through five phases: 1) threshold questions, 2) is this a per se taking, 3) is there
linkage, 4) a balancing test and 5) is this taking for public use. It is through this
lens that Goldstein’s argument will be discussed.
The first phase addresses threshold questions. The first, and easiest, of the
threshold questions is whether or not there is some form of government action. In
Goldstein’s case the answer is definitively yes, the SEC requires hedge funds to
file 13F forms with their agency. These forms are then published on the SEC’s
website at their EDGAR database for the public to view.
Next, the court must determine if the claimed loss is a property right. For
purposes of a takings argument, property has been defined as “denot[ing] the group
of rights inherent in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to
possess, use and dispose of it.”268 Courts later relaxed this definition to encompass
non-physical items as well as recognizing that when “regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.”269
Presumably, the case would be heard in a New York court since Bulldog is
incorporated there. New York, traditionally, has a more lenient interpretation of
what is property than other courts and therefore Goldstein should have enough
evidence to satisfy this prong.270 One of the most famous New York intellectual
property cases held that a license was property even though it did not have an exact
market value.271 Therefore, if the case is heard in New York Goldstein has a better
chance for getting past the first prong. Ultimately, the court will probably
acknowledge Goldstein’s investment strategies as constituting a property right.
The second phase of the analysis is to ask if the claimed loss is a per se
taking. If the loss is in fact a per se taking then there is no need to conduct a
balancing test. However, courts have been very restrictive in assigning per se
status and have carved out only three main categories, the first being a complete
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loss of economic viability.272 This is not the case for Goldstein since Bulldog is
still maintaining healthy profits.
The second category is for permanent physical occupation by the
government.273 Since there is no permanent physical invasion as interpreted by the
courts (such as taking an inheritance or moving soil), Goldstein will not prevail
here. The third is for core rights.274 This is the hardest area to convince the courts
because they have really only accepted the rights to devise/alienate land and the
right to sell as core rights.275 Therefore, this case will most likely not fall under a
per se taking.
The third analysis is linkage. To evaluate linkage the Court in Dolan v. City
of Tigard settled on a nexus test.276 This is a rough proportionality test which asks
if there is a nexus between the goal of the program and what the government is
actually doing.277 Assuming the analysis moves past threshold and per se
questions this is one of the two main thrusts for Goldstein’s takings clause
argument. Goldstein asserts this notion clearly in his request for an exemption
stating:
The legislative history of 13(f) indicates that its primary purpose was to fill an
information gap about the activities of institutional investment managers that would
enable the Commission to diverse regulatory initiatives. However, the Commission
has never used the data in 13F filings for that purpose. Therefore, despite
Congress’ intent in 1975 when it adopted 13(f), there has been no actual connection
between the disclosure scheme of 13(f)(1) and any regulatory use of the resultant
data disclosures.278

Furthermore, Goldstein’s exemption claims that no investor can gain market
confidence from these forms.279 Indeed, Goldstein says that increasing investor
confidence is not necessarily a rational goal to begin with.280 The exemption ends
on the note that, “the suggestion that 13F filings are routinely used for any
legitimate purpose is disingenuous.”281
The SEC will most likely counter with two arguments: 1) 13F forms have in
fact been used as their intended informational database; and 2) 13F forms have
been used to increase market confidence. Regarding databases as late as 2004, the
SEC has commented “neither we nor any other government agency has any
reliable data on even the number of hedge funds or the amount of their assets. We
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must rely on third-party surveys and reports, which often conflict and may be
unreliable.”282 However, the EDGAR database and 13F forms help provide
“information that is reliable, current, and complete” in one database.283 These
databases are used by agencies for a variety of purposes. For instance, the SEC
couples 13Fs with other guidelines such as questions potential investors should ask
to help create more competent investors.284
The SEC has a much stronger stance demonstrating that these forms have
been used to increase market confidence, mainly by assisting in the due diligence
process. Hedge funds, like all investment managers, have had their share of
controversies, which has led to increasing standards for due diligence.285
According to a Deutsche Bank survey, over 60% of institutional investors will take
between two and six months to complete due diligence on a hedge fund.286 Many
of them will hire a private investigator to assist and advise them in this process.287
Advisers will continue to look at these 13F forms for two main reasons.288 The
first is to match 13F forms filed with the SEC to the reports the hedge fund gives
the investor to verify that the hedge fund is not trying to deceive either the investor
or the SEC.289 Secondly, the adviser will look at the 13F forms to make sure the
hedge fund is pursuing the strategy that the investor and the hedge fund agreed
upon.290
A report by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Working
Group) notes that not only do individuals and investors utilize these disclosure
tools, but other institutions do as well.291 Many banks for instance will look at
13Fs to help determine their exposure risk and leverage concerns for hedge
funds.292 13Fs remain invaluable since there is still a division within the industry
and many hedge funds resist providing meaningful information to
counterparties.293 Although there can be some expense associated with these
disclosures to other institutions, they can also be associated with differentiating a
hedge fund, which can lead to raising capital and gaining favorable terms.294
Ultimately, the SEC should have sufficient evidence to support that there is in fact
linkage.
The court will next balance the interests of the hedge fund managers and
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those of the government in the fourth analysis. There are several considerations
that could push this issue in favor of the SEC. First, since rule 13(f) applies to
many different hedge funds, the burden of this rule is spread across a large group,
as opposed to resting predominantly on the shoulders of Bulldog alone.295
Secondly, the courts will take into account just how much the property is actually
diminished in value.296 Goldstein has yet to provide a specific number and at this
time the decrease in value seems to be insubstantial.
A third consideration is whether the property owner who is losing property is
also benefiting. If he or she is also benefiting the court will be less likely to
consider the actions a taking.297 In this case the SEC will argue that increased
market confidence will benefit all hedge funds, including Bulldog, by bringing in
more investors. Lastly, the precedent of over thirty years has been to allow 13F
forms. There has been an increased reliance on these forms, and this is not the
situation where a new rule is now proposing to take away private property. Taken
as a whole these factors seem to weigh in the SEC’s favor.
The last consideration is whether the taking is for public use. As noted,
courts have taken a broad understanding of public use and thus the SEC should
have no problems satisfying this criterion. The Court in Berman v. Parker notes
that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”298 As
long as the exercise in control is rationally related to “a conceivable public
purpose” and the other prongs are satisfied, the government can go ahead and take
the property.299
The government should be able to satisfy this requirement pretty easily,
stating that increasing investor awareness, promoting market efficiency and
strengthening market confidence are all for public use. 13(f) protects investors
from fraud and ensures greater stability in the markets. If, however, for some
reason the court does not find there is a public use, the court could justify striking
down the 13F forms.
VI. RELATED DISCLOSURE PROPOSALS
As noted earlier, the public has several qualms about the hedge fund
industry. Many feel that hedge funds use their power in unison, controlling the
market to their will.300 Tangential to this is the fact that hedge funds often utilize
short positions, which can serve to put negative pressure on a firm’s stock.301
There has also been a long string of hedge funds collapsing, such as Long Term
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Capital Management (losing nearly $4.6 billion in 1998),302 and Amaranth
Advisors (losing $5 billion in 2006).303 There are also the scandals and fraudulent
actions, such as KL Group admitting to a $194 million scam.304
These factors, taken together, have led many to fear and distrust the hedge
fund industry. One of the most widely supported methods for remedying this
situation is increased disclosure practices. In recent years there has been a surge in
the United States calling for tighter regulations, including some increased
disclosure requirements.305 President Barack Obama’s nominee to lead the SEC
vowed to increase enforcement and vigilance, particularly with hedge funds.306
This sentiment is being seen around the world as nations vow to step up their
hedge fund regulations.307
This note will run through several of the most important proposals
examining their merits, ultimately arguing that any future increases in disclosure
should be handled very carefully. There are several considerations to examine
when looking at these proposals. The first, and arguably the most important, is
whether the proposal will hamper a firm’s competitive advantage. There is a fine
balance between protecting investors and intrusion into the market place. When a
regulation intrudes too far into a firm’s ability to compete it runs counter to the
will of the Securities and Exchange Acts, as well as the general notion of a
capitalist market. There is the added threat of driving investors to foreign hedge
funds.
The second set of considerations is the costs of implementation. The
Working Group noted in their 1999 report that direct regulations of the hedge fund
industry come at a great price.308 There are issues of the increased costs for hedge
funds to comply (including possible registration fees), as well as the burden on the
SEC and other agencies of enforcing these new regulations.309 Part of what makes
13(f) so effective is that it neither hampers hedge funds nor imposes large costs on
them.310 The next set of proposals will be evaluated looking at the same
considerations. Many of these proposals, such as the hard-to-value assets
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recommendation, fail these criteria. Others, most notably the private market
intermediary and accredited natural person, fit well within the framework.
The first proposal is online brochures. In 2003, a Staff Report to the SEC
encouraged greater disclosure in the form of a brochure.311 The brochure would be
designed for both investors and prospective investors alike.312 Contained in the
brochure would be important information on how the hedge fund operates,
including: how they value securities, risk management procedures, what lock-in
periods the firm has, and other valuable information.313 The plan was not initiated,
however, and put on the backburner.
In February of 2008 the SEC revisited their plan for brochures.314 Currently
advisers may offer online brochures to state regulators, but are not required to
submit them to the SEC or other federal agencies.315 A move to online brochures
is expected to “reduce compliance costs and yield savings on printing and
mailing.”316 At this point it is too early to accurately determine if the plan will
move forward since there are many crucial issues in the precise details of the
plan.317
This proposal should not have any adverse affect on hedge funds and, aside
from an initial switching cost, should not be too burdensome. The information
contained in the brochure can be found in a number of places already, and thus
does not erode any additional competitive edge. The Staff Report admits that
much of the information is the same as found in a firm’s offering memorandum
(OM) or private placement memorandum (PPM).318 These documents are
provided by hedge funds to prospective clients and provide a fair amount of detail
about the firm. However, some, like Duane Thompson, managing director at the
Financial Planning Association, feel that OMs and PPMs are too thick and
intimidating.319 The brochure would provide information in a much more userfriendly and intuitive format.
Much of the information is also contained in a firm’s Form ADV. Generally
hedge funds with over $25 million in assets under management will file ADVs
with the SEC.320 Part One of the Form provides basic information about the hedge
fund, such as headquarters, number of employees and so forth.321 Part One is filed
and can be recovered electronically.322 Part Two provides more insight into the
hedge fund’s practices, such as fees, strategies and so forth.323 Part Two is not
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required to be filed electronically.324 The 2003 Staff Report also acknowledges
some overlaps with the Form ADV, but again insists there would be additional
benefits to an online database.325
The move to online brochures is more of an extension of existing policies
than a revolutionary change. Much of the information contained in the brochure
can already be found in an OM, PPM or Form ADV. The advantage would be to
create a database with easier access for investors, where they can quickly compare
important criteria between hedge funds. This move should not impair any hedge
funds and aside from initial set-up costs the plan might actually save money over
time. In general, this proposal seems acceptable, but does not seem to make any
real strides towards addressing the faults in the current regulatory scheme.
A second recommendation concerns how hard-to-value assets. The Hedge
Fund Working Group (HFWG) is a group of hedge fund managers from the United
Kingdom (UK).326 In June of 2007, the HFWG set out to study in depth the hedge
fund industry and presented their findings in a Final Report in January of 2008.327
Based on their findings they recommended several proposals moving forward,
including several increases in disclosure.328
One of their proposals is that hedge funds should include more information
on hard-to-value assets.329 The HFWG writes:
A hedge fund manager should, in cases where, in its view, the fund has material
exposure to hard-to-value assets, ensure that any disclosure in its own marketing
materials relating to the fund’s performance is accompanied by a reference to any
factors which may be material to the robustness of the performance calculation. A
hedge fund manager should also do what it reasonably can to enable and encourage
the fund governing body to include similar references in the fund’s offering
documents where they include details of the fund’s performance.330
Such factors might, amongst others, include: the percentage of the portfolio
invested in what the manager considers being hard-to-value assets; the method used
in valuing assets which the manager considers to be hard-to-value; and the use of
side pockets.331
- the percentage of the portfolio invested in what the manager considers to be hardto-value assets;
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- the method used in valuing assets which the manager considers to be hard-tovalue; and
- the use of side pockets.332

The theory behind this recommendation is that hard-to-value assets in
particular pose a huge risk for investors.333 Their value can swing dramatically
and thus investors may not be fully aware of their risk.334 Even sophisticated and
savvy investors may not fully appreciate their risk without knowing some of the
basics to the hedge fund’s operations on hard-to-value assets. That being said,
providing a percentage of the portfolio in hard-to-value assets, the first of the
HFWG’s recommendations, will prove difficult to provide and may unduly scare
aware investors. Providing investors with all of their hard-to-value methods, the
second recommendation might handcuff hedge funds in the future and limit their
competitive edge. Rather, it might be beneficial for hedge funds to offer a few
examples of their methods in the OM or PPM to give investors an idea.
The third recommendation deals with side pockets. Side pockets are “similar
to a single-asset private equity fund.”335 Hard-to-value (or sometimes illiquid)
assets are often designated for a side pocket to provide greater flexibility to the
hedge fund.336 Once the asset is in the side pocket new clients will not share in it,
existing clients may redeem the value once it is finally liquidated.337 Fees are
similar with a management and incentive fee, but the terms of the side pocket are
looser.338 There may be no date for liquidation, and fewer limitations on the size
and nature to the side pocket.339 Adding additional information on the use of side
pockets in the OM and PPM will give investors greater insight for the future, but
ultimately is not necessary. Side pockets are largely negotiated on a one-on-one
basis and therefore the investors will be fully informed of the conditions upon
entering into the side pocket agreement.
There are several important issues to note about this proposal. The first is
that the HFWG is UK- based and has no direct influence in the United States.
However, the UK is an important financial center for hedge funds and US
regulators look closely at their practices.340 Assets under European hedge funds
grew 80% from 2003 to 2005, investors view the United States’ markets as more
regulated and controlled (largely due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the euro
helping European investors are just some of the reasons for the UK’s recent
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surge.341 The United States will certainly keep an eye on if these regulations are
put in place and their effect.
A second issue is that the HFWG is not the formal UK regulatory body.
They are a group of self appointed managers who undertook this project on their
own.342 Critics argue that the HFWG is a non-independent board that has an
obvious interest in how hedge fund regulation proceeds.343 These critics feel that
investors’ priorities were not sufficiently represented and that while the Final
Report is a solid start, much work needs to be included.344 Interested parties in the
United States, like the SEC, surely recognize that the HFWG is not independent
and will view their proposals through this lens. Due to the excessive scope and
costs associated with this project it would benefit the SEC to wait and see how this
regulation plays out in the UK first before moving ahead with their own initiative.
However, in its current form the proposal seems to place too great a burden on
hedge funds and will hamper their competitive edge.
The HFWG’s Final Report has an even bolder proposal for the future of
hedge fund disclosure, and that is industry disclosures. The proposal is to create an
easily navigable database on industry characteristics made available to the
public.345 The information would include statistics like the number of hedge funds
in existence, assets under management, definitions (of strategies, industry terms
like side pockets and similar issues), typical fee structures and other useful
information to investors. HFWG Chairman Sir Andrew Large said: “The initiative
had come about because the industry’s largest firms recognize there is a deficit in
accurate and comprehensive information about the hedge fund industry, and that
they should rectify it. Improvement is needed in two areas: publicly available
generic data about the sector; and information about individual firms.”346
The first obstacle to this proposal is that hedge funds can not advertise and
solicit the general population.347 Sir Large advocates that if the information is
purely factual in nature and not used as a solicitation the project could go
forward.348 Even information as seemingly harmless as assets under management
could be viewed as a selling point if easily compared to assets under management
by other types of investment managers (such as mutual funds). Additionally,
typical strategies that are available to hedge funds exclusively may be seen as an
advantage and therefore a selling point.
The second obstacle is the cost associated with maintaining accurate
information.349 Statistics, such as the number of hedge funds and assets under
management, will constantly be changing and surveying the markets could be
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costly. Determining how often to update the information is another issue that has
direct implications for the costs of the project.
In its current state this proposal seems unlikely to gain traction in the United
States anytime soon. One adaptation would be to move forward with the project,
but only make the information available to sophisticated investors who qualify to
invest with hedge funds. The industry characteristics can be provided to investors,
along with the hedge fund’s OM or PPM, to give the investor a better feel about
the industry as a whole. This might serve as one last warning to investors who
technically qualify to invest with hedge funds but who still lack the sophistication
to truly appreciate the risks associated with doing so.
Another proposal that has been advanced is the creation of a new regulatory
body.350 This proposal can manifest itself in one of two forms, the first of which is
a self regulation organization. A pure market discipline theory, or self regulation,
argues that banks and securities firms have incentives, including shareholder
pressure, to limit their risk to hedge funds.351 Avoiding excessive risk will force
banks to limit their exposure to hedge funds, or in other words, hedge funds’
leveraging will be capped.352 However, this theory often breaks down since in
good times banks are more generous with their loan processes to obtain even
greater returns.353
Self regulation is sometimes augmented by introducing a self regulation
organization (SRO), such as the Federal Reserve.354 The SEC could help assist in
the creation of the SRO and what its powers would be.355 SROs usually keep up
with industry needs and trends fairly well and can be more sensitive to compliance
costs than a pure regulatory body.356 SROs internalize the costs for regulation and
therefore have a natural incentive not to over-regulate the industry since they are
the ones to who balance the costs and benefits.357
A SRO would have the benefit of industry support, natural incentives not to
over-regulate, fair fee schedules, and the ability to maintain a pure market feel to
the industry.358 A SRO would help prevent some of the fraudulent activities and
blow-ups that have plagued the industry. However, establishing the boundaries for
the SRO might prove difficult. How much hedge funds would be required to
disclose to the SRO, and how that information would be protected, would need to
be addressed from the start. This method has promise but is currently not being
supported by any major agencies or big players in the industry and for the moment
does not appear to be seriously considered. A more likely solution will be in the
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second form of a new regulatory body, that is, a private market intermediary.
The second version of a new regulatory body to examine is a “private market
intermediary.”359 This has the unique feature of increased disclosure to a private
party, rather than the public at large.360 Under this plan a singular or select few
private rating agencies would receive increased information about the hedge funds,
such as more details about their leverage and risk.361 For this plan to move
forward there would have to be assurances on the safety of the firm’s propriety
data, but the government has made similar agreements in the past.362
This will in effect create industry standards which the intermediary will
monitor.363 Hedge funds will need to be certified by meeting minimal standards
and operational practices.364 In order to receive future investors the firm will need
to maintain its certification, otherwise it will lose substantial business.365
Proponents of this solution do not feel that it is a stand alone solution since the
influence of institutional investors is not limitless.366
This plan offers several significant advantages to all interested parties. This
would definitely ease concerns for investors, such as pension plans, who will now
take comfort in minimal standards and increased oversight.367 Secure hedge funds
will most likely already meet the standards and may welcome the change as a
chance to block out future competitors. They might also benefit by increased
investor confidence which would translate into new investors to entering the
market. The SEC and other regulatory agencies will also benefit. Hedge funds
will finally be regulated bringing greater security and stability to the markets, but
the SEC will not have to deal with the direct costs of the oversight.
However, there are a number of drawbacks and weaknesses to this approach.
There are several issues surrounding the establishment of the intermediary. Hedge
funds will not back this proposal without feeling secure that their propriety
information can not be leaked or will be shared with other government agencies.
Small hedge funds are particularly likely to resist since the costs will impact them
more and getting certified might prove more difficult. There is also the issue of
agreeing on industry standards. Firms already disagree on effective (and
responsible) levels of leverage, investment strategies, general disclosure
requirements, fees and other operational considerations. Furthermore, the
considerations large, established firms will agree on can drastically differ from
those of smaller firms just starting up. Investors, for that matter, also differ on
what are acceptable standards.368 A further drawback is that potential conflict of
interests could arise with the intermediary serving both investor and hedge fund
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interests.369
Another consideration for this proposal is where will funding will come
from.370 One answer would be for hedge funds to pay a registration fee; however,
this will likely deter hedge fund support. The intermediary could receive funding
from the federal government but that means that the taxpayers would bear the
burden and that could prove difficult. Investors could pay a modest fee when they
access the intermediary’s information but that alone probably would not be
sufficient. The most likely answer is a combination of the different fees to spread
the cost around.
This proposal has a lot of merit behind it, although there are substantial
hurdles to overcome. The concerns with hedge funds, such as overleveraging and
fraudulent accounting practices, would be addressed with greater oversight. At the
same time a firm’s competitive advantage is not severely hampered since the
information is not shared with the public or other hedge funds. This plan does not
appear to be ready for action anytime soon, though. First, hedge funds must agree
with the standards which could get drawn out. The issues of funding the program,
information security and other operational considerations also threaten this
program. All the factors taken together weigh favorably for this policy to move
forward.
A fifth proposal centers on commodity pool operator filings. Commodity
Pool Operators (CPO) are organizations or individuals who pools funds into
commodity options or commodity futures.371 CPOs register with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and as such have to submit annual filings.372
These filings include risk and performance disclosures under Title 17 of the
Commodity and Securities Exchanges §4.373 Many hedge funds meet these
requirements and do in fact register and report to the CFTC.374
The Working Group recommended several changes for hedge funds that are
also registered CPOs in their 1999 report.375 The first suggestion is that these
reports are filed quarterly instead of annually, allowing the information to reach
investors quicker than the current process.376 In addition, the scope of these
reports should include more information on market risk “without requiring the
disclosure of proprietary information on strategies or positions.”377 Lastly,
individual financial reports should also be published.378
This suggestion has several complications that dim its chances. The first is
that not all hedge funds are CPOs and therefore do not register with the CFTC.
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The Working Group makes note of this point and suggests that Congress enact
legislation mirroring the CFTC’s regulations.379 Getting the legislation off the
ground and having it match the CFTC’s in order to avoid unfairly burdening one
group of hedge funds (i.e. those that are CPOs or those that are not) will take time
and may even prove impossible.
The second complication is that many CPOs opt out of the disclosure
requirements of the CFTC.380 A CPO needs to satisfy two conditions to do so.
First, the CPO must not be subject to any statutory disqualifications under Rules
§8(a)(2) and §8(a)(3).381 This means that the CPO must be free from fraud,
material investigations, penalties and the like. Second, the CPO must meet all of
§4.7’s requirements.382 The quickest, and most efficient way, to do this is having
the client sign a §4.7 waiver, which enables the CPO to treat the client like a
Qualified Eligible Person.383 The CPO must still file the annual report, but does
not need to file as much information.384
If the CFTC pushed filing from an annual schedule to quarterly, it would
receive opposition, not only from hedge fund managers, but from all CPOs. A
similar sentiment surrounds expanding the scope of disclosure requirements since
this risks revealing propriety information. Even if these changes are approved, not
all hedge funds are CPOs and many that are opt out of significant portions of the
disclosure process. All these factors taken together mar this proposal’s chances.
A sixth proposal concerns how material exposures to highly leveraged
companies are disclosed. The Working Group made another disclosure proposal in
their 1999 report; however, it was for public companies and not hedge funds.385
The Working Group offers that public companies, including both financial and
non-financial firms, should “publicly disclose a summary of direct material
exposures to significantly leveraged financial institutions.”386 Leveraged financial
institutions could include hedge funds, banks, finance companies and others.387
The rationale behind this move is to add greater weight to private market discipline
and cause public companies to pay closer attention to their risk lest running the risk
of enraging their shareholders.388
Currently, neither the SEC nor the generally accepted accounting principals
specifically call for such a measure.389 The information conveyed should include
their exposures and to whom, how they are measured and their diversification.
The Working Group suggests this information could be contained in a document
publicly filed with the SEC, such as Form 10-K and Form 10-Q.390
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This proposal has been mulled over by authorities following the collapse of
LTCM in 1999.391 Following the collapse, Patrick Parkinson, Associate Director
of Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve, testified that:
Primary responsibility for addressing the weaknesses in risk management practices
that were evident in the LTCM episode rests with the private financial
institutions—a relatively small number of U.S. and foreign banks and brokerdealers, most of which were LTCM’s counterparties. . . . [P]rudential supervisors
and regulators have a responsibility to help to ensure that the processes that banks
and securities firms utilize to manage risk are commensurate with the size and
complexity of their portfolios and responsive to changes in financial market
conditions.392

This proposal has several advantages that makes it attractive. First, the costs
associated with this idea are minimal since this information is readily available to
public companies already. Second, this should not hamper competitive edges too
much since banks and other public companies already make it known to
shareholders that they do in fact invest in hedge funds, but do not necessarily
disclose full amounts. This recommendation has minimal intrusion into the market
place and could make large strides in restoring investor confidence.
One last disclosure proposal concerns investor requirements. Currently there
are minimal requirements investors must meet in order to pool their money into a
hedge fund. These standards have not been revamped for over twenty years now
and many regulators feel they are outdated. By elevating the standards, even fewer
people will be allowed to receive a hedge fund’s PPM or OM and other materials.
By extension, this means that even fewer people will receive the disclosure
statements from hedge funds. Increasing the standards to include fewer people
will limit the number of potential investors, which is a huge downside for hedge
funds. The regulation will, however, mean that only the most sophisticated
investors will receive the information and should know how to employ it most
effectively. There have been several variations of this proposal put forth.
The first variation deals with accredited investors. The current standard is
people who earn $200,000 a year or who hold over $1 million in net worth.393
Since this standard was first introduced over twenty years ago the number of
people who meet these criteria has increased significantly.394 However, some meet
this benchmark due to inflation and not a true increase in wealth.395 Raising the
bar would ensure that only sophisticated investors are involved which allows
hedge funds to take on their risky investments without overregulation.396
This regulation will most likely include a grandfather clause for those who
are current investors but would not meet the new standards. Therefore, this
regulation will do little to comfort these investors. A second complication is that
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the SEC and other regulatory bodies will not benefit much from this new change.
There is no increase in the amount of data available to the agencies for them to
make decisions.
The second variation looks at accredited natural persons. At the end of 2006,
the SEC set in motion a proposal to create a new class of investor, the accredited
natural person, who would be allowed to invest in hedge funds.397 This definition
would supersede that of the accredited investor and therefore replace it.398 The
new proposal states that a person must have at least $2.5 million (adjusted every
five years for inflation) to meet the minimal requirements.399 The exact number of
investors who will now fail to meet the requirements has not yet been studied.
The difference between the two recommendations is essentially how high the
bar should be raised. Of the two measures the SEC’s accredited natural person
criteria has the essential benefit of including measures for the future. This
proposal takes into account inflation and provides a periodic check to increase the
standards. Although this proposal will not solve many of the problems with in the
regulatory scheme, it does seem necessary. By restricting some of the clients, the
hedge fund industry may benefit from less litigation since only the most
sophisticated investors remain.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hedge funds are a large and important player in America’s financial
landscape. Due to the recent surge in the number and influence of hedge funds the
financial sector has experienced some growing pains. Specifically, regulatory
bodies such as the SEC are still figuring out the right balance between a healthy
environment for hedge funds and protecting investors.
For over thirty years, the SEC has relied on 13Fs to help strike this balance.
However, a recent challenge to their validity by hedge fund manager Goldstein
could throw this balance off. Goldstein makes two distinct claims: 1) that the
information contained on the form falls under trade secret protection, and 2) the
SEC’s actions amount to a regulatory taking.
Most likely Bulldog will not prevail on a trade secret argument. Because
there are three specific instances where Bulldog reveals this information, they are
not the most ideal plaintiff to advance this argument. This will actually be
problematic for most firms since many firms divulge certain aspects of their
strategies to attract potential customers and retain current ones.
The courts will not view the incomplete, and sometimes outdated,
information on a 13F as sufficient enough to satisfy the second prong of harm.
Two Sigma, a fellow hedge fund, made a similar argument similar to Bulldog’s in
2005 which was shot down since they could not prove specific ways to reverse
engineer from 13F forms.400 Since 13F has been around for over thirty years,
firms should be able to prove specific instances where they were harmed. Until
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they can actually point to such instances, 13Fs will remain in play for their
information gathering uses and due diligence.
The second argument is a takings argument, which will be quite difficult for
hedge funds to prove. Firms need to look no further than the first analysis,
threshold questions, to encounter problems. Hedge funds need to convince courts
that their strategies are in fact “property” as intended by the Fifth Amendment.401
The fact that there is no market value to the strategies could be a problem, but
ultimately courts should be receptive to this argument but not to the point where it
would be classified as a per se case.402
Courts will have a tougher time resolving the policy issues since there is no
precise rubric. Courts will have to weigh the balance between hedge funds’
competitiveness and investors’ knowledge. Since there is an extensive history of
protecting investors, and eliminating fraud is crucial to healthy markets, the courts
will most likely side with the investors.
There are several important distinctions between this and Goldstein’s first
lawsuit, which he won. Since the 2006 case, several hedge funds have collapsed
and committed fraudulent actions which have raised concerns in Congress. A
second distinction is that Goldstein’s case will be subject to stricter scrutiny since
he is now challenging Congressional legislation as opposed to an agency’s
interpretation and courts give broader deference to Congressional acts.
One last difference is that the first case was based on a change in a rule that
had only existed for a short time; whereas Goldstein’s new case is based on 13(f),
which has been applied to case law for over thirty years. 13(f) has functioned in an
acceptable manner as a whole; therefore, to be overturned would require a more
persuasive argument than the one Goldstein and Two Sigma have advanced to be
overturned. Thus, for the foreseeable future it would appear 13Fs are secure.
Beyond 13(f), there are a number of new disclosure proposals in the pipeline.
Their promulgation comes from a variety of sources including the SEC, Working
Group, foreign regulatory agencies and some even from the hedge fund industry
itself. Each of these proposals weighs intrusions into the hedge fund environment
and the associated costs. These factors are weighed against the added security to
investors and markets, as well as the ability for agencies to more effectively do
their jobs.
Currently, none of these proposals seems ready for implementation outside
of a few years due to the intense battle of the details to follow any of them.
However, several of the recommendations have great merit and can serve to
benefit both investors and the hedge fund industry. Therefore, it is very likely that
in the coming years a version of several of these ideas will be put into place. In the
end, it seems that new regulations are only a matter of time.
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